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This particularistic and exclusionary form of identity
politics has intensified in recent years within and
among nations.____ !tis responsible for some of the most
egregious violations of international humanitarian
law and, in several instances, of elementary
standards of humanity..__ Negative forms of identity
politics are a potent and potentially explosive force.
Great care must be taken to recognise, confront
and restrain them lest they destroy the potential for
peace and progress that the new era holds in store
(Kofi Annan, The Guardian, (Nigeria) 1997:8).
Single or multiple identities underlying fears of losing
national culture is an implicit belief that identities
are singular. But people do not have single fixed
identities. They have multiple and often changing
identities and loyalties. Accepting Multiple Identities
is a major social transformation. But history shows
that it does happen. Almost all European countries
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have undergone such a transformation. (pp.101-102
Human Development Report 2004).
INTRODUCTION
The colonial project which was foisted on Africa largely by
Britain and France left the continent more dis-united and generated
more consciousness among groups about their distinctiveness and
those factors that separated them ("we") from others ("they").
One of the most enduring outcomes of the colonial contact was
the creation of self-doubt and the negation of identity formation
among the dominated population. Frantz Fanon (1969:200) gave
an eloquent account of this development when he said inter alia
that
Because it is a systematic negation of the other
person and a furious determination to deny the
other person all attributes of humanity, colonialism
forces the people it dominates to ask themselves
the question constantly: In reality, who am I?
Under the guise of anthropology as a scientific enterprise,
scholars made fortunes out of highlighting the features of warrior
tribes or what were referred to as the martial races, and their
kingdoms, state and acephalous societies. The presence of large
ethnic groups, some of them far larger than those in Europe, was
conveniently ignored so that the label and stigma of tribe would
stick. In the main, some of Africa's complex socio-economic and
political organizations were ignored by European authors.
In the struggle that culminated in Africa's independence, the
different groups were, in most cases, forced to coordinate their
struggle in order to be free of colonial domination. It must be
remembered that the road to independence was bloody in most
cases, though in some, it was granted on a platter of gold. The
Maumau uprising in Kenya and the coal-miners strike as well as
the Aba Women's riots in Nigeria symbolized bloody resistance
to colonialism and its methods. Kenya's rural producers objected
to land redistribution away from peasant farmers. The Maumau
resistance was severest in settler regions where there were
plantations. It was in essence, Kenya's peasants resistance to
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the colonial occupation of their land. Really, there were many
features of the colonial society that were provocative: segregation
in housing, employment and schooling, and the killing of natives
for pleasure.
The colonial setting thus produced a culture of violence and
brutality directed at the natives. The claim of a civilizing mission
in Africa by the colonial powers was indeed absurd. Africa later
realised its naivety in endorsing, generally without much resistance,
the European incursion into its territory, the enslavement of its
people and the exploitation of its resources. This awareness,
however, came rather too late. The damage had been done.
Communities had been decimated, resources looted and ways
of life had been adulterated. The trust basis of society and the
perception of others as the extension of the self almost became
extinct. A world-renowned novelist, Chinua Achebe, had provided
an excellent summary of this development in Things Fall Apart, and
for Africa the centre indeed no longer holds. In the definition of
the colonisers, to be accepted as modern, Africans must evidently
demonstrate a measure of distance from their culture and thus
from their roots. Africans were and still are expected to exhibit
a hatred for themselves if they are to be described as modern
thus, part of globalisation - a new euphemism for slavery and
dependency. Really, how can one hate the self which is what
an individual's denial of his culture comes to? Unfortunately, in
several facets of life in Africa, self-denial of our essence lingers.
The colonial constitutional development created a new
consciousness by making ethnic affiliation a major element
in political socialization and leadership recruitment, but at
independence, the goals that were set included national integration
rather than regional or ethnic solidarity. What a paradox? These
goals were incompatible as loyalty to the ethnic or regional groups
was difficult to transfer to the nascent state. In fact, as for the
majority, the notion or the existence of the state was only on paper
or an idea of the empire builders, itself an afterthought as it was
after World War II that preparations were commenced, shoddy
ones at that, for the transfer of power to the colonial subjects.
The colonial order was strident in its opposition to collaborative
activities between ethnic groups. Colonialism triumphed mostly
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on the divide and rule tactics.
Thus individuals in the post-colonial African society display
multiple identities. These identities are variously expressed. An
individual's membership of the new nation-state is a nascent
form of identity expression. The individual's membership of his
ethno-religious group is much older and more enduring than his
membership of the new nation-state. The individual may also
be a member of the recently-formed employee's association
- the Trade Union Congress. The identities that can be paraded
are indeed numerous. These multiple identities come to play in
moments of critical decision-making and these identities do affect
an individual's life chances, the socio-economic and political
opportunities that are manipulable by him. These loyalties, rather
than waning, have waxed over the years and they do have
implications for the enjoyment of citizenship rights and Africa's
democratization processes.
These identities are often conflicting in the interests that
they seek to project and protect. They may, in fact, obstruct the
universalistic and libertarian principles on which democracy is
premised. They are, however, not fixed as they are open to activation
or suppression or even transformation depending on the events in
the social environment (see the opening sentences by Kofi Annan).
There are certain objective realities that dictate which of the several
identities comes to the fore. State actors in Africa seems to prefer
the fragmentation of identities as these make the formation of a
formidable opposition that could challenge the state's hegemonic
rule a remote possibility. The state could thus act surreptitiously
to encourage the factionalisation and disintegration of strong civil
societies in order to ward off strong counter-hegemonic forces and
thus weaken those identities that are considered as undesirable. A
faction of the state, armed with strong identity credentials, could
also seek to pull down the state. The foregoing issues are made
more explicit in the following discussion.
Some definitions of the key words in this paper are appropriate.
The Harper Collins Dictionary of Sociology refers to identity as the
sense of the self that develops as the child differentiates from parents
and family and takes a place in society. The sense of identity could
be based on ethno-religious and temporal factors or geography.
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It is often the basis of social action and political behaviour. The
sense of identity deepens in a plural society where a group, just for
reasons of its being different, suffers discrimination. Identity could
also be based on some physical characteristics. Citizen's rights
refer to those rights that one enjoys by virtue of one's membership
in a country. The scope of these rights owes a lot to the profile of
the state and political struggle. By democratization, it has meant
the opening up of the political space, the demise of military rule
and the introduction of multi-party democracy in place of the one
party state. However, we could have multi-partism with individuals
not really having alternatives to choose from.
This paper's objective is to highlight how multiple identities may
facilitate or hinder access to citizenship rights. Multiple identities are
paraded for a variety of reasons. They may have their own relative
autonomy but somehow they connect individuals to specific rights
and privileges from which others may be excluded. Democracy, on
the other hand, claims universalistic ethos. Theoretically, therefore,
democracy and the disclosure of multiple identities cannot co-exist
as they have potentially conflicting appeals.
In the second section, the paper raises some theoretical issues
while in the third section, the paper focuses on identity politics
and democratization in Africa and highlights how the outcome
has impacted on citizenship rights. The conclusions are contained
in section four where I issue a caution on the problem of politics
of social exclusion as I attempt to plot the path to a sustainable
democratic future for Africa in the midst of multiple identities.
By its very nature, democracy does not admit nor approve of
group rights yet in Africa, groups claim to property (until recently)
eminently override the claims of individuals. The challenge,
therefore, for scholars in and about Africa, is how to make the
practice of democracy in Africa become more accommodative and
tolerant of plurality of identities and thoughts while simultaneously
advancing citizenship rights and thus democratic consolidation.
SOME THEORETICAL ISSUES
To those who believe that globalization is a most desirable and
beneficial phenomenon, the resistance to it remains a major puzzle.
In many parts of Africa, Asia, the middle East and Latin America,
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what globalization holds out are believed by many to be false. The
more the intensity and profundity of the change process, the more
enduring seems the value system that contradict the move toward a
uni-polar global hegemony. This resistance has several dimensions.
The most worrying is that which seeks to emphasize and even
adore the distinctiveness of a group, its homogeneity and those
characteristics which separate it from those of the others. In the
extreme, this position does not admit of ethno-religious and political
pluralism. This world view was similar to the position of those
who regard the triumph of western civilization as incontrovertible
and inexorable. An average African, perhaps an Asian too,
simultaneously discloses multiple identities - a village person, a
town's man or woman, a Muslim or Christian, an active member
of an ethnic association, an employee and employer, a politician,
member of an old school association, an age grade member, a
unionist, an active member of a neigbourhood association and
perhaps a lineage head. The demand of these diverse associations
on an individual may conflict and if simultaneous, is capable of
creating a dilemma for the individual actor.
Social formation in Africa is complex, and identities may appear
to be ambiguous and conflictive as individuals simultaneously
occupy many roles. In my field work experiences, I have come
across individuals who are labourers, farmers, employers and shop
owners at the same time. Most Africans actively participate in the
formal and the informal spheres simultaneously. The playing out
of many roles sequentially or simultaneously is seen as normal
by many. A Nigerian politician describes himself in the following
terms is indeed typical of others:
I am a living laboratory of my age.... I am at once the
cocoa farmer, mercantile clerk, the civil servant, the
petty trader, the transporter, the capitalist and the
intellectual (and now the politician) all materials for
the study of the social scientist (Adegoke Adelabu
quoted in Post and Jenkins, 1973:33).
Where individuals parade multiple identities, role multiplicity sets
in which in turn complicate social class formation and political
action as well. Thus an
analysis of politics, religion, kinship were ....... a
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part of any adequate account of social change as
economics and that the manner of their interaction,
in any particular society, must be a matter for open
enquiry, rather than the known consequences of a
universal model of society (Peel, 1983 :6 ).
How to account for the re-surgence of identity based politics
and its enduring nature in the midst of globalization remains a
major challenge for academic and state actors especially those
who believe in a unipolar world and read too far into the end
of the cold war as signifying 'The End of History' (Fukayama,
2001 ). Some authors indeed had predicted the ultimate triumph
of western civilization and its values in its competition with other
civilizations (Hunttington, 2001 ). The event of 9/11 was however a
sad reminder that there are people in the world that do not see the
reality that others cherish, who reject the consumption-oriented
society and who do not subscribe to the values which others hold
dear. The end of history is thus further away. The demise of bi
polarism and of the Russian empire may not really signal the end
of history nor the ultimate triumph of western values. The future is
really pregnant with a lot of meanings. It is worthwhile to recognize
that identities are not static, they get transformed and are open to
manipulation. In their transformation, groups that were otherwise
once antagonistic may be forced to pool resources and sink their
differences in order to confront what is perceived as a common
monster. The forging of political alliances are often dictated by
vested interests and these are often open-ended, and practical
realities would dictate which alliances are most feasible and which
of the identities should be on the front burner.
In both the developing and even developed countries, groups
within states whether these groups are religious or ethnic groups,
are claiming rights that are exclusive to them and from which
others are to be excluded. Indeed, identity-based politics has not
abated whether in Spain between the Basques and the Spaniards;
or in Belgium between the Fleming and the Walloon; or in the
Irish Republic between the Catholic and the Protestants; or in
America between the American-whites and the other hyphenated
Americans; or in Nigeria between the different ethnic groups; or
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in Rwanda between the Hutu and Tutsi. In its early history, the
American-whites did not all have the same rights - the timing of
migration to America was initially important in the determination
of political rights (see Archdeacon, 1984).
There has emerged a serious contestation between the rights
being claimed by those who consider themselves and their
groups as indigenes and those who are considered by them as
"strangers" and who may also see themselves as such. Behaviour
and attitudes that have practical outcome for social exclusion
are often premised on these distinctions between the notions
of "citizens" (indigenes) and "strangers." Mamdani (1996) had
referred to this dichotomy between citizens and strangers in terms
of citizens and subjects, whereby the colonial regime administered
the people of the colonies under two laws - one for the citizens
and the other for the subjects. The exclusionary practices that flow
from this dichotomy do occasionally produce overt behaviour that
could burst out. The social fabric of society could be eroded thus
endangering political stability and peaceful co-existence of groups.
The modern state is thus under pervasive pressure from groups that
make competing claims over the state's scarce values. The state is
hardly in a position to meet the claims of competing groups over
state resources. Whatever our conception of the modern state, in
spite of all its paraphernalia and sophisticated architecture, is after
all, preoccupied with the regulation of the relationship between
diverse groups and interests in society.
In the relationship in which individuals and groups become
entangled, they are often not equally treated. The denial of access
to significant resources may endanger political stability and the
enjoyment of citizenship rights by identifiable groups in society.
Social and political inequality promote feelings of alienation and
frustration. Political participation becomes encumbered. The
connotation of citizenship as 'full members of the community'
(Marshall and Bottomore 1992: 18) is denied to those who are
perceived as being different from others. There are three kinds of
rights that have become popular - civil (rights of free speech, right
to worship etc); political (right to vote and be voted for); and social
(right to housing, health, etc). These rights, even under advanced
capitalism can readily be abridged or compromised.
104

Olurode-ldentities

The concepts of social prejudice and stereotype are important
in understanding the ways in which people judge and treat others
(the out-group) who are different from them (the in-group).
Somehow, through the process of socialization, individuals begin
to construct their identities. As individuals become full-fledged
members of their society, they unconsciously acquire its cognitive
map of 'we' and 'they' and they thus inevitably inherit a world that
had been perfected by others. Individuals' view of reality become
tainted from birth. This view often fails to recognise other systems
of seeing and being. The end-product of this process could be
hatred or love for others that are adjudged as being different. This
point raises some methodological issues which are outside the
scope of this discussion.
Bibby's (1959) work dealt extensively with how prejudice
impact on our behaviour toward others. Prejudice forces people
to draw conclusions before having the opportunity to interact with
others. Though prejudice is learned, it is difficult to unlearn even
when compelling information to the contrary is presented. Hatred
is an extreme manifestation of social prejudice. In this connection,
I can mention the massacre of the Jews during the second world
war. There was also the hatred of the Arabs and Islam in America
and Europe after the event of September 11 (see Mamdani, 2004).
In France, the ban on head ties was believed to be directed at Arab
women. In Rwanda, the mutual distrust and hatred between the
Tutsi and Hutu, and between the Croatia and Serbs in Yugoslavia
are examples of this point. The human tragedy in the Darfur region
in Sudan is the outcome of social prejudice, social exclusion and
intolerance. The Darfur region in southern Sudan had been the
cynosure of world attention because of the Sudanese genocidal
attacks on the non-Arabs. This tragedy is a direct result of the
Sudanese government's failure to manage multiple-identities and
pluralism.
As a response to the centrifugal tendency and the exclusionary
politics that social prejudice and stereotype may generate, states
have often designed different political contraptions to contain the
divisive implications. It would be recalled however, that colonial
rule had previously amplified the wedge that might have existed
previously between groups. Thus, as a prelude to its politics of
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divide and rule through the indirect rule system, the ethnographers
and anthropologists of Africa had altered the Africans' mode of
thought. This was accomplished through the categorization of
Africa into different ethnic and linguistic groups with little regard
to common identities. Yes, differences existed, but these are often
exaggerated to make nonsense of any possibility of reconciliation
or coordinated action against colonial domination. The concept
of tribe was used to refer to the people of Africa irrespective of
the level of social and population development. But European
groups with even lower population and less sophisticated political
architecture were described as nations. That the anthropologists
and the missionaries were the handmaidens of colonialism could
not be disputed and in many instances they collaborated and their
activities reinforced each other. It did not, therefore, take much
time before Africans began to think of themselves in terms not of
their own making (Grinker and Steiner, (1997:47).
The intellectual support which was provided for colonialism,
the self-doubt, and social prejudice that thereby became fostered
cannot be regarded as insignificant. Among Europeans and
Africans alike, the thinking that some people were unprogressive
and unintelligent whereas other groups were portrayed as the
opposites became widespread. The work of Levine (1966) on
Dreams and Deeds was one of such classic works in the fostering
of social prejudice. Levine's work identified the lbos as more
mobile on the indices of modernization and were followed
closely by the Yoruba with the Hausa-Fulani trailing far behind the
two major groups. The practical consequence of this 'scientific'
endeavour and similar other works was a portrayal of the different
African groups as not only incompatible but with antagonistic and
irreconcilable aspirations. A year after this publication, the civil
war broke out in Nigeria. It is not being suggested that the book
was the cause of the Nigerian civil war but such anthropological
works fueled feelings of group hostilities. Such writings had offered
enough justifications for the exclusion of certain groups from socio
economic opportunities.
However, the fallacy of this social science thought was evident
in Nigeria where the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group was thought of by
Europeans as unprogressive, unintelligent and backward. These
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wntrngs were in the main ideological and teleological hence
Claude Ake's reference to social science in Africa as imperialism
(Ake, 1979). African leaders, however, continue to fan the embers
of hatred and parochialism as these suit them. In Nigeria for
example, the Hausa-Fulani, mainly because the British handed
over power to the group believing that they were more pliable and
conservative have come to see themselves as destined to rule. This
remains strong and the northern governors once said' ... whatever
anyone may say, the incontestable fact remains that in the political
equation of this country, the North holds the ace. In fact, if there is
no North, there will be no Nigeria' (Sunday Punch, November 19,
2000). This hardened prejudice makes nonsense of the dialogue
under the auspices of the National Political Reform Committee
which was inaugurated on February 21, 2005. Not surprisingly, the
issues of resource control, resource sharing and of which ethnic
group should rule dominated discussions at the meetings of the
Political Reform Committee. The participants did not demonstrate
equal concern to wealth creation, good governance, social justice
and how to overcome mutual suspicion between groups.
Unless social prejudice is moderated, the practical outcome
would be that some individuals would come to be defined as
strangers (or settlers) and would be regarded as having no full
citizenship rights which are available to the indigenes. The
citizenship claims which are open to the non-indigenes became
qualified and the foundation for treating them unequally and with
disdain had become established though sometimes contestable.
In these ways, identity politics become antithetical to the notion
of democracy and the rule of law as outlined by Montesque and
John Locke. What really is left of citizenship rights in the absence
of equality before the law and equality of access to the market,
education, healthcare and housing among others? Without the
right to vote and the right to property, citizenship rights are
deprived of all their vitality and spirit. Some of the ways in which
identity politics constitute a direct challenge to the nuances of
democracy and the very notion of citizenship are discussed in the
next section.
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IDENTITY POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Identity politics revolves around the parade of particularistic
features as the basis for political participation and inclusion as well as
the enjoyment of citizenship rights and privileges. This identification
could be such parameters as gender, ethnic, language, religious
or regional affiliation. In India for example, distinctions are made
between the different caste groups - some are regarded as free
born and they exercise more political, social and civil rights than
the others. Marriage and other forms of interaction are not often
permitted between the groups in order to avoid contamination. In
the eastern part of Nigeria, the Osu caste is discriminated against
in marriage, economic and political sphere. Even in the United
Kingdom, it is difficult for someone who is not from the mainland
to become the Prime Minister. Scotland not only has its own
judiciary but it is also set to have its own foreign mission in such
countries as China. The battle for self-determination by the Basque
is believed to have reached its crescendo. The Fleming and the
Walloon in Belgium continue to contest their ethnic autonomy.
Also very early in its development, there were qualifications as
to who can become senators or representatives in the American
Congress. Foreign-born Americans were not then on the same
footing as home-born Americans in terms of citizenship rights.
Identity politics is not a phenomenon that is unknown to
Western European or North American politics nor is it disappearing
under advanced capitalism. To be a representative or a senator,
one must have been a citizen for at least 7 or 9 years, respectively,
prior to assuming office. This provision was contained in Article I. In
Article II of the U.S. Constitution, it was decreed that no immigrant
naturalized after the adoption of the Constitution could become
President or Vice-President (see Archdeacon, 1984:54).
Because it emphasizes political participation and the exercise
of rights that draw from particularistic principles, the universalistic
and libertarian notion of democracy become easily compromised.
Even where the codes of entitlements to participation are written
down, there are norms and practices which define those that
are to be included. Under such a system, competitive politics is
handicapped. Political roles become rigidly defined and those who
capture political power see it as divinely ordained. In a multi-ethnic
society, however, individuals who transcend identity politics may
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have an upper hand and wider base to recruit supporters from.
There are individuals whose identities are not straightforward
either for reasons of marriage or birth. Though Soni Ghandi led the
Congress Party to victory, she could not become the Indian Prime
Minister because she was regarded as a foreigner - an Italian by
birth but an Indian by marriage. During her campaign, she herself
had made use of the Ghandi's family respected identity.
This particularistic notion of politics is more common in
Africa and in spite of Africa's claim to be experimenting with
democratization, instances of erosion of democratic and citizenship
rights are on the ascendancy. I shall refer to four case studies to
illustrate the vibrancy and not the demise of identity politics in
Africa as has been theoretically and enthusiastically announced
by some authors. I relied on the internet and newspapers for most
of this section. Sometime in 1996, the then President of Zambia,
Frederick Chiluba, (using the machinery of his Movement for
Multiparty Democracy), altered the constitution of the country
to prevent Kenneth Kaunda from standing for elections. When
Kaunda challenged the constitutional provision which sought to
strip him of his Zambian citizenship, the court ruled that Kaunda,
being born of Malawian parents and having not renounced his
Malawian nationality, had thus governed Zambia illegally from
1964-1991. Of course, it was clear that the intent was to prevent
Kaunda from exercising his political rights in the 1996 election.
In Cote d'Ivoire, identity politics came to the fore after the
death of its former dictator - Felix Houphount-Boigny-in 1993.
Henry Konan Bedie had assumed the presidency of the once
buoyant West African cocoa-producing economy. Bedie sooner
than later introduced a new concept of 'lvorite' - real lvorians as
different from foreigners. The hidden agenda being to regulate
political competition. Alassane Quattara was the first casualty and
the only target. Though many became victims of this obnoxious
policy as they were disenfranchised (because of their new identity
as foreigners), Quattara who was the main target was prevented
from contesting the presidential election. This politics of exclusion
remains at the centre of the crisis in the once peaceful and buoyant
Cote d'Ivoire that had previously been paraded by France as a
model of a progressive economy and stable country. The groups
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at war in Cote d'Ivoire are yet to lay down their arms.
Sometime in 1982, Nigerians woke up to learn of the
deportation of Abdul Rahman Shugaba, the then majority leader
of the House of Assembly in Borno State, Nigeria. The allegation
against him by the then civilian administration was that he was not a
Nigerian but from a neighbouring republic. Shugabi's real offence,
however, was that he was being too critical of the then federal
government. The federal government was also uncomfortable
with Shugaba's association with the then progressive politicians in
southern Nigeria. The ruling northern political party (the National
Party of Nigeria) thought that Shugaba, being a northerner, should
identify with his fellow northerners and their dominant political
party. Though the court ruled that his deportation was illegal, he
suffered serious infraction of his fundamental rights as a citizen.
The events in Togo, West Africa brought to the surface the
resilience of identity politics. After the death in February, 2005,
of President Eyadema, who had ruled Togo since 1967, his son,
Faure, was hurriedly sworn in after the constitution had been
amended to prevent the Speaker from ascending to power. The
only qualification of Faure was his being the son of Eyadema. Of
course, this provoked a series of demonstrations and it attracted
sanctions from ECOWAS and the African Union. Elections were
later held and Faure was elected.
The above illustrations have shown how identity politics can
obstruct the wheel of democratization as it erodes the political
rights of citizens. It could sometimes degenerate into forced
migration and mass displacement of people who are routinely
turned into refugees as the struggle for citizenship rights assume
fratricidal dimension. There are ample instances of this in Africa.
Once the political rights of citizens are violated, the assault on
other rights become common. Identity politics can, in this way,
constitute impediments to development. In Nigeria for example,
there are parts of the country where land rights may not be
granted to non-indigenes and where those who regarded as such
are confined to specific areas meant for strangers. So frustrating
to Nigeria's President was this phenomenon of "strangers" and
"settlers" that he declared in 2004 that 'All Nigerians are settlers"
(The Punch/ July 3, 2004). The manipulation of multiple identities
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endangers the very tenet of liberal democracy. In Nigeria, it poses
a direct challenge to property rights (see Nnoli, 1978:115-116).
In the conclusions which now follow, I outline the ways in which
multiple identities may obstruct citizenship rights and thus the
consolidation of effective democratization in Africa.

CONCLUSIONS: MULTIPLE IDENTITIES AND EFFECTIVE
DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA

Africa has certain features which may not predispose it to
effective democratization. Unlike the countries of Western Europe
where most people live in an urban environment, most of Africa's
population reside in the rural areas. Though the annual rate of
urban population growth outstrips that of the rural area, yet over
60% of Africa's population of about 500 million are rural dwellers.
Rural poverty is also more severe than that of the urban area.
Whereas urban dwellers may employ or adopt strategies to escape
some imperatives of the consequences of multiple identities, their
rural counterparts have little room to maneuver themselves out of
the crisis. Though research reports have often indicated the desire
of the urban African middle class to be involved in hometown
activities, in reality, they desperately look for an escape route from
simultaneous rural-urban involvement. This is not surprising as deep
involvement in the affairs of the community costs money. On each
visit, rural folks expect gifts in cash and in kind. The simultaneous
involvement of elites in the rural and urban sphere, apart from
straining them financially, exposes them to embezzlement which
may have deleterious effects on social services provision. The
problem of poverty is thereby compounded. It also has the potential
of undermining tradition and political rights at the grassroots. Those
who exert tremendous power in the urban space also desperately
seek to line up the rural poor as clients.
Individuals may have different identities which can be
simultaneously disclosed, but acting out the roles which flow
from these identities may provoke a dilemma or even role
nonperformance. Role nonperformance creates room for
ineffective discharge of functions which may, in combination with
other factors, promote poverty. Poverty remains severe in Africa
as over half of the population live on less than one dollar a day.
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The corruption of Africa's political elites has prevented the majority
of its toiling masses from taking advantage of its rich resource
endowment. This corruption arises in the context of conflicting
pressure for resources from kinsmen and women. During research
interviews, poor people have often openly argued that for them
the democratization project is disconnected from their lived
experiences what with dilapidated school buildings, unpaid salaries,
pension and gratuities in the midst of acute sense of insecurity
of lives and property as well as the epileptic infrastructural base.
African leaders display open disdain for the ballot box and thus
the wishes of the people. The elites simply assume that their
money should deliver the votes. It is difficult to appreciate how
democracy can work under conditions of widespread poverty and
corruption, which in turn often precipitate intra-ethnic and inter
ethnic conflict by forcing multiple identities to the front burner of
political competition.
Through whatever lens this is viewed, the simultaneous
participation in the rural and the urban sphere takes time and
money, it takes more of the time resources of the poor and the
physical resources of the middle class. So is the simultaneous
or sequential disclosure of identity. This may send contradictory
signals. For effective democratization to take root, the people's
elected representatives must be monitored but the individuals
who are to monitor are also deeply involved in cult-related and
intense religious activities which may entail night vigil, clapping,
dancing and other forms of rituals and celebrations.
In the midst of the above, is it not surprising that there is any
symbol of procedural if not substantive democracy in Africa? The
absence of an overwhelming political apathy in Africa in the midst
of multiple identities and their all encompassing expression really
raises a major theoretical puzzle. There are some other relevant
and pertinent issues about the future of democracy in Africa. In
Africa, group ownership of land as the main economic resource
is common. In fact, several years of capitalism had only begun to
marginally erode groups' claim to land ownership and other viable
resources. Theoretically, where a lineage or clan owns land, the
exercise of individuals rights over such resources is constrained.
In Africa, individuals may exercise the usufruct rights in
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property but not the right of alienation, and law courts have
often affirmed the superiority of group rights in property over
individual rights. This, no doubt is a fetter in the advancement
of capitalism. Yet, liberal democracy can triumph better under
conditions of advanced capitalism. The problems of insecurity of
life and property, coupled with poor infrastructure have meant
that people have to organize themselves in groups to agitate
for and create access to better services. Many have learned to
take their exit from the state (Osaghae, 1999). Group solidarity
thereby gets strengthened. Individuals who enter into politics are
expected to exploit their offices to project group rights by placing
kith and kins in employment positions even over those with
better qualifications. Successful politicians are expected to attract
government patronage to the community. The success or failure
of politicians is measured in these terms. How is this expectation
compatible with the universal competitive claim of democracy on
individual basis? The presence of rich mineral resources in fact
offers a veritable platform for identity politics as communities
are forced to form groups in order to be able to exert sufficient
political leverage to obtain a desirable outcome. It is envisaged
that had Nigeria's agricultural capitalism progressed, it might
have recorded a more impressive outlook in its democratic path
than it had been possible under oil rents which more than cocoa
are more supportive of group claims and group pressure. Under
commercial agriculture, land alienation and sales of labour power
had commenced and these were becoming a common place.
Really, labour-capital relations had then made some progress.
Thus fractured citizenship rather than common citizenship has
become elevated. Nigeria's Constitutions in 1979 and 1999 had
given the prime of place to what is referred to as the federal
character which in essence project group rights and identities over
those of individuals. Jinadu (2004:31-34) has documented several
instances whereby fractured citizenship triumphed over common
citizenship. To be appointed into high political offices, individuals
are forced to mobilize the sponsorship of their ethnic or religious
group or other forms of identity. Thus the liberal theory of the
state has been argued to be fundamentally flawed because of its
parochial, unificationist and assimilationist assumptions (Jinadu,
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2004:12). The assumption by the liberal expectancy school that
with capitalism and globalization, the features that separate
one group from the other would disappear remains unfulfilled.
The radical expectancy school has also failed in that social class
affiliation is not exhaustive of identity formation. At some levels
in some societies, social class differences are subsumed by other
categories. The foregoing pose a serious theoretical challenge to
scholars on Africa. In order to advance Africa's democratization,
we may have to concede political rights to groups while
simultaneously admitting of individual citizenship rights. In most of
Africa, children are simultaneously born into groups and individual
families. The rights which groups exercise over such children as
individuals may be waning but they exist. When individuals die,
the groups into which they were born largely bury them. If Africa's
practice of democracy, and citizenship claims are to be sustainable
and enduring, they must be anchored in the people's culture.
As much as possible, Africa must be supported to be itself in
this age of democratization and globalization if the process of
abridgement of rights is to be arrested. Inasmuch as the present
practices of democracy are tantamount to dis-empowerment,
they constitute a fetter on the exercise of citizenship rights. A
veritable platform for political disenchantment thereby becomes
feasible. The opening sentences of this paper by Kofi Annan and
the 2004 Human Development Report bear testimony to the
fluidity and elasticity of identities. The view that the end of history
is here forecloses tolerance of individuals and groups who choose
multiple identities.
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